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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THg MATTER OF THF~ ESTATE
OT<' HILLARD L. VOORHEES,
Deceased,
BETTY HAYWARD, BEVERLY
CLYDE, and TRACY COLLINS
TRl TRT CO., administrator,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
-vs.-

Case

No. 9400

PEARL 0. VOORHEES,
Defendant and
Appellant.
HANSON LAND AND LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Appellant .and
Intervener.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENr.I' OF FACTS
This appeal arises out of the probate proceedings in
r:t'he l\latter of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, file number 2655 and the civil action entitled
Betty Hayward and Beverly Clyde, plaintiffs, vs. Pearl
0. Voorhees, defendant, file number 4784, both from the
District Court of Sanpete County.
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Parties before the court in this appeal are the appellant, Pearl 0. Voorhees, widow of Hillard L. Voorhees,
deceased, and the respondents, Beverly Clyde and Betty
Hayward, daughters of the appellant and the deceased.
Reference made hereafter to the appellant, Mrs. Pearl
0. Voorhees, shall be as ''Mother", and to the respondents,
Betty Hayward and Beverly Clyde, as ''Daughters."
Hanson Land and Livestock Company, which intervened in probate 2655 only, is designated as "intervener"
and shall be referred to hereinafter in that manner. Intervener comes into this action to protect its rights to
purchase certain lands and grazing permits under an
agreement entered into with the Mother in October of
1958 (Tr. Sept. 15 55-56).
Walker Bank and Trm5t Company is the administrator of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased,
but does not participate in this appeal.
The dispute necessitating this appeal involves a claim
by the Daughters that land and property deeded to the
M~other in 1940 should be placed in trust and proteeterl
for their ultimate use and benefit; and in support of this
claim, they assert that the land and property belongs in
the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, and therefore should be treated in the same manner as other Estate
properties. The disputed property consists of the family
home and farm situated near Manti, Utah, pasture and
sheep land designated as the Mountain Ground and
located in Sevier and Sanpete Counties, Taylor Grazing
Permits, and personal property consisting, for the most

.,

,)

part, of furniture from the family home. This property
r;hall be n·ferred to herein as the "separate property."
The property jn Hillard L. Voorhees' name at the
time of his death is listed in thP inventory and appraisement filed in the probate proceedings of 1957, and will
hereinafter he referred to as the "estate property." As
to tlie estate property, ther0 ir-; no dispute. (Rl 2655 24)
In 19+0, Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, conveyed by
der1l to his 1vife, Pearl 0. Voorhees, appellant, as grantee
the separate property CF~xh. +, 5, 6, and 7: (Tr. Oct. 21
92), Tn 1!)53, prior to taking a trip by automobile, Mr.
arnl )J rs. Voorhees infornwd Betty Hayward, their
<laughter, that the:T had executed instruments conveying
tlie Peparate property to her and her sister (Tr. Oct. 21
:19, 90). Jn 1956, prior to the death of Hillard L. Voorhees, the Mother causPd the deeds (Exh. 4, 5, 6, and 7)
11aming her as grantee of the separate property to be
rc>cordcd (Tr. Oct. 21 10.t). Fo Ho wing the death of
Uillard L. Voorhees on .July 24, l 956, the petition of
the llfother to be appointed administratrix was granted.
'rhis is the background upon which the appeal is based.
The proceedings presented for review commenced
"With the hearing in the probate matter on October 21,
1957, followed by the hearing in the civil action on April
1, rn59 (the trarnscripts are designated 'l1r. Oct. 21 : Tr.
Apr. 1
). The next proceedings presented are the
hearings of August 29, 1959 and September 15, 1959
which were consolidated hearings of both cases (the
trans<'.ripts will be designated Tr. Aug. 29
: Tr. Sept.
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15
) . Following these was the hearing on February
1, 1960, entitled to probate nmuher 2655 (the transcript
will be designated Tr. Feb. l
).
There were two hearings subsequent to the February
l hearing which were entirely in the probate matter;
they were apparently not reported because the transcripts
were not filed by the derk. They were held on March
14; 1960, relating to petition to distribute grazing permits, and on December 5, 1960 relating to motions for a
new trial. It is impossible to differentiate the civil from
the probate in the consolidated hearings or which proceedings and what evidence the court eonsidered in its
judgment of October 2, 1959. It is equally impossible to
determine which proceedings, and what testimony and
documents the court considered in entering its decrees
of distribution. Two decrees in probate 2655, both dated
October 13, 1960, were entered; one relating to real
property and one to grazing rights. Reference to the
decrees of distribution will be as one unless specifically
identified. For the reasons stated, the circumstances
presented by this appeal are set forth in four stages:
First, the testimony and documentary evidence in
the probate proceedings from the appointment of the
Mother as administratrix to July 17, 1958, the date of
filing the complaint in the civil action.
Second, the pleadings and the memorandum of understanding filed in civil action 4 784 and the hearing on
April 1, 1959.
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'l'hird, the hearings of August 26, and September 15,

195!1. "·herein the probate and eivil matters were consolidated and heard jointly .
.F'ourth, the hearing on February 1, 1960 and the
fffO<'Pedings subsequent to that date wherein the decrees
of distribution \Vere made by the court.
rrhe first stage deals with the administration of the
estatP h.v the Mother and the proceedings to remove her
from that position. Immediately following the death of
hPr It us hand, the Mother discussed the property with
thP Daughters and Betty assisted her in the duties rela
ting to the property by keeping accounts of expenditures
and other details. This required frequent discussion of
the estate matters, including the sales of the estate propert~' and the .Mother's use of the separate property
(Hl 2655 233-236). These discussions ultimately turned
to the problem of the final disposition of the separate
prop(~ rt~'· One of the Da nghters (Beverly Clyde) had
song-lit legal advice as to the best method of managing
the Pstate and separate property, and as a result informed the l\f other of the desirable features of a trust
naming them beneficiaries. These discussions culminated
in a consultation with \Valker Bank & Trust Go. and the
preparation of a trust agreement (Dep. Feb. 5 34).
'l'he (_•fforts were of no avail, however, because the trust
agreemeut prepared did not contain a provision making
the transfer of the property to the trust irrevocable. The
l\fother's retention of any rights in her property after
transfer to the trust, except a stated income, was un-
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arreptahh• to the Daughters (Tr.
Sept. 15
72:
1
Dep. Feh. 5 :14). 1 he failure of the trust agreement
ehanp;e<l the nature of things; the Daughters referred
thP matter to connsel, who filed the petition to revoke
the Mother's letters of administration and to compel
delivery of the estate property they alleged was wrongfull~" withheld (R.1 2655 29,30).
A hearing on the petition was held in Manti on
October 2L 1957, at which time the Mother appeared and
testified. She stated that the deeds (Exh. 4, 5, 6, and 7)
were executed by her husband in 1940 (Tr.
Oct 21
56), were given to her that day or the day following their
execution (Tr. Oet. 21 96-97), ~were retained by her
in a steel box where she kept her other papers (Tr.
Oct. 21
97-98), and that she took the deeds from the
box in .June of 1956 and recorded them when it became
apparent that Mr. Voorhees was near death (Exh. 4, 5,
6, and 7: Tr.
Oct. 21
104). She also testified that
the deeds to her Daughters were signed by both her and
her husband but were retained in his safe until after his
death when they were destroyed (Tr.
Oct. 21
91).
No order or judgment was entered by the court except to
permit the Mother to withdraw as administratrix (Rl
2655 Minute Entry Oct. 21, 1959).
The second stage covers the events relating to the
civil action against the Mother and the circumstances
leading to the judgment of Oct. 2, 1959. The Daughters
filed their complaint on July 17, 1958 alleging that tile
to the separate property was in Hillard Voorhees at the

tirn0 of his death and was rightfully property of the
Ij~state an( l asked for punitive damages for the wrongful
4784
1 ). The Mother denied the
"·ithholding (R
allegations of the complaint and the case was set for
trial April 1, 1959. On that date counsel for the parties
drafted the memorandum of understanding. The court
was advisecl that such a document had heen signed by the
partiP:-: and the~· requested the matter be rontinued without date to give> an opportnnit~; to reach agreement. The
memorandum of understanding was not filed with the
court a11d it >Yas stat('d that if the efforts failed, either
party <·onld rall the case for trial (Tr. Apr. 1 1,2).
H w;u; in Ortoher, 1958 that the l\fother entered into the
agr0Prnent with the intrrvener (Exh. 3:
Rl
2655
2:)3, ~36). In thP text of this agreement, the parties
r0cognized that the title to tl1P land covered was in litigation and that a decision b~· a court might adversely aff Pct that tith~. The memorandum of understanding specifi<'all~r repudiated this 1958 contract but the court never
determined the validitv of the contract or the ownership
of tlw propPrty covPred by its terms.

rrhP third stage presents the hearings of August 29,
J %!! and SPptPmher 15, 1959. These hearings saw the
coJlsolldation of the J1~state l\f atter and the civil action
l'<'Sulting in the judgment of October 2, 1959 entitled civil
aetion -t-784 and probate matter 2655. The settlement of
::in atcount in the Estate Matter had been set for August
29 and argument on the amended motion was on the
ealendar for the same date. (R 4784 24: R2 2655
3:
rrr. Aug. 29 1). The motion was to compel
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of property aceording to the memorandmn of
understanding and not for trial of disputed issues as
mentioned in the statement of f'Ounsel (Tr.
~\pr. 1
1. 2) . .\t the ~.\np:ust 20 hearing, the intervener appeared
because it had !ward of the repudiation of the October
contraet ( Exh. ~) ,,-ith the )fother, hut efforts to ohtain
a copy of the me1110ranclulll had heen unrewarding. The
inte1Tener appPan•fl as a party in all subsequent prohatf:l
matters i Tr.
~ept. 15
:13 ..)(i:
R3
2(i55
4-36).
This stage was initiated h~- the opening statement of
c-ounsel for the Dau~hters. He represented to the court
that conversations had taken place between the parties
in an attempt to reaeh an understanding. The effort was
to no avail, and for this reason the Daughters felt it
necessary to bring tlw matter hefore the court to compel
their l\f other to transfer the separate property to the
Estate pursuant to their interpretation of the terms of
the memorandum of understanding <Tr.
~\ug. ~9
1,2). In response, counsel for the )fother stated that
the property was to he de posit Pd with \Yalker Bank &
Trust Co.! simpl~- as f'Ustodian: and in order to protect
her, no other arrangement should be required until agreement had been reached and the trust formalized (Tr.
Aug. 29 +).
deliver~·

Following the statements by counsel, the )[other
took the stand as a witness and was interrogated as to
items of personal property, the expenditures of money,
and the sales or purported sales of property. The inquiry into expenditures "·as detailed, covering all items
from payment of tithing to repairs on the lawn mower

9
(Tr.
Sept. 15 62-96). The matter was then continued
to Sept0mlwr 15, 1959 at which time the ~Iother again
test ifiP<l. arnl except for one instance her testimony was
limite<l to the subject matter of the August 29 hearing.
Thr l'X('<'ption was her testimony relating the discussions
with hN daughter, Betty Hayward, about the formation
of a t rnst prior to the commencement of civil action 4784
(Tr. Sept. 15 72).
_.\ t tlH-' ('on cl usion of the September 15 hearing, the

('Ourt announced its judgment, which was signed and
enterc'd on October 2, 1959 in both cases (Tr. Sept. 15
100-10:1). The judgment followed the language of the
mPrn11r:rndum of understanding hut did not contain any
orr1.n relating to the accounting, the sole subject matter
lwfor(- the probate court. The judgment was subject to
fnrtlwr order of the probate court and the acts of the
parties in formulating the trust be be created (R 4784
:19).

The fourth stage details the efforts to prevent the
premature distribution, the attempts to sell, and the resollltion to distribute the property to the Daughters. It
is mainly concerned with the February 1, 1960, hearing
which was conducted as a probate matter. The administrator had filed a petition requesting the court to confirm the sale of the separate property to the intervener
( H~ ~G55 ~90). 1-'he petition asked that the sale be
eonfirmed at $15.50 per acre. This price was agreed to
between the administrator and the intervener and was
raised from the $15.00 provided for in the agreement
between the Mother and intervener (Exh. 3: R2 2655
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290:
rrr.
Feb. 1 33). Tt was also brought to the
attention of the ronrt that the intervener had paid
$10,000.00 on the purchase price at thP time of its exer 11 _
tion (rrr. Feb. 1 11-13; R2 2G5:5 406).
ThP Daughters prntest('d this petition (R2 2G55
318) and petitioned the court to distribute to them all
the property (R 2fi55 300). They, like the administrator, wanted to st>lJ but with one important difference.
Their petition asked the court to distribute the property
to them subject to the payment to the Estate for deposit
in the trust tn be created of an amount equal to $15.50
per acre, but leaving the propert>r so they could deal with
it outside the probate court (R2
2655
300;
Tr
Feb. 1 1-62).
At one stage m the proceedings, the attorney for
the administrator advised the court that the Mother was
present and, though not represented by counsel, had requested him, as a favor, to state to the court that she
would like to protest the petition to distribute all of the
properties to her Daughters (Tr. Feb .. 1 9). She took
the witness stand, and upon the examination by the court,
testified that she had deposited the property with the
administrator for the purpose of expediting the formation of the trust, and that she could not permit the
distribution of any property until the provisions of the
memorandum had been completed (Tr. Feb. 1 17-18).
Nothing further \Vas heard with respect to the objection
and protest of the Mother, and the court proceeded to
hear further testimony on the petitions for sale and
distribution ('Tr.
Feb. 1 40).
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rl'Jw tPstimony pn·sented did not relate to the owner-

slii p of pro1wrt~' nor was there any inquir~- about the
existenr·e of a trust. The hearing was confined to the
d<~tai Is of an areonnting and Ow possibilities of the sale
of all ti!(' real property. The parcels of Mountain Ground
im·lndPd as estate property ·were originally appraised at
$8.00 per aere and the :'.\fother testified that one J. \Valla<'e \Vinrh (Tr.
Feb. 1 19), through eounsel for the
<l:rngliters. lrn<l attempted to purchase the Mountain
Gronnd inclnded in the estate and separate property for
$8.00 per arre, prior to the contract with the intervener
(Tr.
FC'b. 1
19). Arron Hanson, testifying for the
intC'n·ener, bid $15.50 per acre for all the Mountain
(1 round. He also advised the court that an action to
prnted tlw inkrvener's rights under the contract of
Ortoher, 1958, had been commenced in Sevier County.
Notwithstanding this offer to purchase, Mr. Hanson
testified that he was not relinquishing the intervener's
rights nrnler the contract (Tr.
Feb. 1
45). The
Mother lrnd tPstified that she intended to abide by her
agTeement with intervener (Tr. Feb. 1 23).
ln addition to the land, there were 1,870 grazing
permit:;; that belonged to the Mother at the time of the
<l('a th of her lrnshand. She had sold these to the intervener and the Bureau of Land Management had aut horizt>d the tram;fer err. Feb. 1 26). The intervener
confirmed the purchase at $10.00 a head for the 1,870
grazing permits, the price he had agreed to pay by the
<•.ontract with the Mother. At this point in the hearing, a
per~on in the court room (later identified as Mr. J. Wal-

12
lace \Vinch) offered to make a bid in excess of the one
before the court (Tr.
Feb. 1 54) and the court recessed for lunch to permit tlw presentation of a written
bid.
Following the noon recess, the court announced that
it had received a written offer by J. \Vallace \Vinch to
purcha~w the prop<•rty for $17 .50 per acre ( R2 2655
327: Tr.
Feb. 1 58). The intervener then offered
to purchase the property for $18.00 per acre and $10.00
per head for grazing rights (Tr. Feb. 1 60). These
offers caused considerable argument and counsel for the
Daughters stated:
"MR. NIELSEN : Now our bid, when I say
ours, Mr. Winch's bid, and I helped him prepare
it, Mr. Winch's bid is in excess by ten per cent the
amount which Mr. Hanson had bid and I submit
under the provision of the statute that the bid
should be confirmed.• • •
THE COURT: Your petition, is that the entire interest be set over to the girls, is that
correct?
MR. NIELSEN : That is the petition, •
(Tr. Feb. 1 61-62).

..,,

Following the argument the court-at the suggestion
of "a gentleman in the audience"-took a further recess.
When the court reconvened, it stated that it had made up
its mind and thereupon denied the petition for sale and
granted the petition for distribution to the Daughters.
On February 29, 1960, present counsel appeared on
behalf of the Mother (R2 2655 336). Further peti-
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tion:-; and order~ to show cause were filed by the
Danµ;ht(~r:-:, and objections to the distributions and orders
wt-rP filed on Lehalf of the Mother and the intervener
( H2
2fi;)5
360-:·rnl, 361. b). The minute entries relating to thP hearings note their protests to any further
distributions, which entries are the only record--except
pleadings--rnade of the objections to the orders to show
<·auf'c and petition for distribution (R2 2655 356).

On October 13, 1960 the court signed two separate
<lec·rePf:. One decree distributed to the Daughters a 2/3
interest in all real property, both separate and estate,
not theretofore distributed (R3
2655 436-440). The
other decree distributed to the Daughters a 2/3 interest
in J .870 Taylor Grazing Permits previously owned by
decedent (RH 2655 445), but which permits had theretofore been transferred by the Bureau of Land Management to the Mother and later to the intervener (Tr. Feb.
1 26, 30, 28, 47, 50, 51).
8T ATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION ARE VOID FOR
WANT OF JURISDICTION.
POINT II
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING W 1..S INRUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND THEY AFFIRMATIVELY SHOW
THAT APPELLANT WAS WRONGFULLY DENIED THE
RIGHT TO DEFEND HER PROPERTY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
'THE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION ARE VOID FOR
WANT OF JURISDICTION.

Tlw jurisdiction of the probate court over property
is acquired by the death of a person having title to property or obtaining title thereto by one of the statutory
procedures' available to heirs, executors, and administrators. \Vhere there is no jurisdiction because there is
no title or ri~ht to possession, any order or decree of the
probate court affecting such property is void. In this
case, title to the separate property was not in the deceased at the time of his death and has never heen aequired by the Daughters or the administrator, and the
decrees of distribution affecting the separate property
are void.
The jurisdictional distinctions an<l procedural requirements relating to probate matters and civil actions
are clouded in the case presented by this appeal. This was
accomplished by the method of calling up the civil case
on a motion at the same time an estate matter was set on
the probate calendar. Notwithstanding this, the exercise
of jurisdiction by the court in its judgment of October 2,
1959 is an issue.
1 Sec. 75-1·2 (Where wills proved and
tated 1953.

f~

granted) Utah Code Anno·

Sec. 75-4-5 (Succession in absence of will) Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Sec. 75-11-5 (Actions to recover personal property) Utah Code Annotated
1953.
Sec. 75-11-3 (Right of possession) Utah Code Annotated 1953.

F('(1n1 t liP ti111e title to the pro pert:· lweanw a legal

i-.;:--·11<· i11 1 >dolH'r_. I ~l;J/. tl1P Da11ghtPr:-: have att<•111pted on
1Lr1·1· "l'•'<lc'l()ll" to a1·11uin• titl<' to tl1P s<•paratP prop(jrt~'·
Tl1ci1· fir.'d at11•1upt \\'<Is tl1<• petition to rrmove the Mother
;1:-: ;1dt11in1strn1ri:-; 1tpo11 tl1f· cl<tilll that sh<> was \\TOJHTfullY
.
\\it lilwlding- pos:-wssion or prnpert:· belonging- to the
I•:> tat<:· ( H 1 21i5G
29). 'J1he petition dated September
:..>::. l '.l:-J/ set forth the procedure of Seetio11 75-11-18, Utah
Code .\ nnotated 195:3:
~

··Citation to pPrso11 snsp<>ded - Order to
rl'tnrn.-The (·ourt rna:· n·quire anr person sus}H'ded of Jiaving taken wrongful possession of
an:· of tlw effects of the <le<'edent or of having
lu1<l sueh e ffeets under his control, to appear and
:-:1iln11it to an examination under oath touching
:-:Heh nu,ttkrs; and if on sueh examination it
ap1i.~ars that he has wrongful possession of any
such propert:•, not adversely claimed, the court
may order the delivery of the same to the executor or a(hninistrator of tht> f'Rtate."
In tlit> hem·ing on the pdition on October 21, 1957,
thP ]lotlicr was 0xamim•d eoncerning the property
claimed l(J lw \\Tongfnll.'· withhel<l. Aftt>r hearing the
PYidt>JH'(' and apparPntly being full:· advised, the court
e11lc1<•11 it~ order date(l Odoher 28, 1957 permitting the
"Jlotl1Pr to \\·it lid nm· as administratrix but did not make
an:· finding or order relating to the daim that she was
\rithholding JH'OJWl't\. fo making tlw order of October
2~. tfo• eou rt wa8 proceeding under a statutory provision
giving it jurisdidion to determine whether there was
a \\ 1011gf1tl \\·ithltolding of property belonging to the
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The statute ah;o gave it authority to order
delivery of property it determined belonged in the Estate.
In this proceeding, the court had before it all the heirs
and the administrator, which persons constituted all the
necessary and proper parties to exercise its jurisdiction.
The issue was presented to the court and it must be
concluded that its failure to compel the delivery of the
property by its order of October 28, 1957 constituted a
determination of the facts (Rl 2655 86). 'The factual
situation relating to the title was not pleaded again in
the probate court. The court determined that the estate
did not have the right to compel delivery and subject
the separate property to the administration of the Estate,
and its decrees of distribution of October 13, 1960 are
void. 37 \Vords and Phrase::; at page 698, 699:
:E~state.

"Order in proceeding between executor and
an individual concerning securities was 'res
judicata' in individual's proceeding against
estate. In Re Stahl's Estate, 27 N.E. 2d 662, 305
Ill. App. 517."
"A probate court's order in favor of executor in proceeding between one of deceased's executors and an individual concerning individual's
claim to an interest in securities belonging to
deceased's estate to establish ownership of interest
in securities by reason of alleged gift causa mortis
by deceased, where order was a final determination of ownership of securities and no appeal was
taken therefrom. In Re Stahl's Estate, 27 N.E.
2d 662, 668, 305 Ill. App. 517." Also see In Re
Spi~wsa's, Estate, 255 P. 2d 843.
Following the proceedings terminating in the order
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of Octolwr :2S, 19fi7, the Daughters commenced civil

adion 478+ in the same court. The complaint contained
tlw same allegations and was pursuant to the same
statntor~' authorit~· as tlw petition of 8eptember 23,
1957 in tlw probate court. However, there was no ref(·n~1wP to the order of October 28, 1957. The findings
of fad supporting the judgment of October 2, 1959 are
(\Onsistent with the testimony of the prior hearing in
th(• probate ('Ourt in that title was found to be in the
Motlu'r (R 4784 33). The judgment, however, is inconsistf'nt with the prohatP proceedings in that it ordered
the separate property deeded to the administrator subj0d to the administration of the I~state and to the creation of a trust. (R 4784 39).

In entering its judgment of October 2nd, the court
was cteciding matters previously determined by and
within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The same
rr>snlt must follow with rPference to the decrees of
October 13, 1960. There was no plrading, subsequent
to October 21, 1957, filed in the Estate Matter which
plaeed the title of the separate property before the court
for tletermination. In entering its decrees of distribution
of October 13, the court was bound by the determination
of fads made as a result of the order of October 28,
1957.

The jurisdiction of the court in entering its judgnwnt of October 2, 1959 is questionable on other grounds.
lf the probate court attempted to try title within the
framework of the probate procedure or distribute prop-
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erty over whi(·h it did not lrnv<• jnrisdi<'tion, the eomt
exceedecl it~ ;jnris<lidion. Tf the jurisdidion of the court
was invoked to qui0t title hut it ordered a conve_vanee
suhjed to prolonp;ell supervi::.;ion of the court, it either
failed to exereisp or exreeded its jurisdiction. In He
Rice's EstatP, 111 l7tal1 --1-28, 182 Pac. 2rl 111, set forth
two important requirements of the district court's ('ivil
and probate functions:

•'* '~ '~ The divisions of the court can he likened to hn) arms. The probate arm and the civil
arm. For orderly procedure, it should use the
most appropriate, but it has the right to use
either. To give it this right there are two important requirements: (1) Have the necessary
parties been given the proper notice as required
by the statutes for the particular relief sought;
and (2) are the procedural requirements of the
proper code being complied with~ If these standards are met, then the court can determine which
is the appropriate arm but it cannot refuse the
use of either."
While the court defined the district court as a court
of general jurisdiction which could sit as a probate
court and at the same time exercise civil jurisdiction, it
reaffirmed basic principles enunciated in prior cases.
Hampshire vs. Woolley, 72 Utah 106, 269 Pac. 135 :
"A person's rights and the relief which he
may be entitled to are based upon and measured
by the established rules of law and procedure.
The court may have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and of the parties, and still the judgment or decree be void, because the procedure
employed by the court was such that the court

was not authorized to exert its power in that
way."

rl'o the saine effect is tlw holding in Ill Re Roger's
};stole, 76 fltah :290; 284 Pac. 992, where there was no

proof ol' perfonnanee under a eontract:
.. rl'hPn• is no finding of any fact which will
support a judgment that Cornelius West has
eomplied ·with his contract. Under such circumstan('<~s the probate court was without jurisdiction
to direct Katie S. Rogers to execute a deed to
Cornelius "\Vest. To invoke the Ju.r.-isdvction o.f
the r·o11rt there nwst lJr appropriate pleadings."
Ttalies added.

'I'he judgment of Octolwr 2, 1959 was not the result
of thP observance of the procedural requirements set
forth h~Y this eourt. The allegations and prayer were
lmsPd on the same statutory authority as the petition
to n~voke letters of administration in thP Estate :Matter.
\Vlten the two causes were consolidated for hearing, the
procedure was entirely prohate, the same as utilized in
the usual settling of an account. The consolidation offered
no opportunity for the assertion or trial of an adversary
matter. No evidence was taken to establish title to
property and questions of law raised hy the pleadings
were not decided. The judgment confirmed title in the
Mother by ordering her to convey it to the administrator
by warranty deed. The absence of procedural requirements is illustrated by the remarks of the Court at the
eonclusion of the September 15, 1959 hearing (Tr Sept
15 l00-101):
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''THE CO UHT: \Vell I believe, Gentlemen
that I have arrived in this matter. It is m;
opinion that the construction of this agreement
Plaintiff's l~xhibit 1, provides the key to a deter~
mination of this case. In Paragraph 12 it seems
to me entitled to, and I so hold, is entitled to the
construction that the Mrs. Voorhees is entitled
to make an accounting of her administration of
the Estate and also of those items that she claimed
to be her o-wn such as she has made this case.
Otherwise it would seem to be that she would be
deprived of the benefits which the contract gives
her a.s is provided in Paragraph 1 of this contract. Although the life insurance policy, not
the life insurance, the health and accident policy
is not mentioned specifically and although the
testimony is that it was, it named Mrs. Voorhees
as the beneficiary, I conclude that under the terms
of the contract that the court should and the
court does include that as a part of the Estate
to be accounted for."

It can only be concluded that the judgment of October
2, 1959 is void because the court either did not have
jurisdiction or it rendered a judgment in excess of its
jurisdiction. The judgment and decrees of distribution
have left the Estate in a serious condition. The court
is required to supervise the formation of the trust, including the designation of a trustee; then it must direct
the trans£ er of the property to the trustee; then, if the
property is sold by the Daughters, it must decide the
value of "other assets"-if the money is spent before
the trustee is designated-and then upon the successful
completion of these tasks, entertain a petition by the
administrator for final distribution and discharge.

POINT II
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WAS IN·
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE .JUDGMENT.

11 1! <> f'Oll rt 's <'onstruction of the memorandum of
nnderstanding "'hPn it <:>ntered its judgment of October
'.2, 1959 is not cl<:>ar. lt could be one of four things; a
f'ontrnet, a deel:uation of trm;t, a stipulation, or nothing.
It i::-; hard to (•onceivc it as a contract hecause it does
not state a (•onsirlPration; it does not d(-lscribe the propPrty; it says that it is an agreement to agree on the
<'r(-la t ion of a trust, and it is eornpletely aleatory. It
cannot be a memorandum of an oral agreement because
it sw~eifically i'ltatc8 there is no agreement on the material provisions. 1 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 107 at page
3~():

"ft has already been shown, and it will appear
at HHlll~' plaee8 in this treatise, that a 'meeting
of the minds' is not an unvarying prerequisite
to an enforceable contract. But if it is made clear
that tlwre has in fact been no such 'meeting of
the minds,' the eonrt will not hold a party bound
b~, a <'<mtract varying from his own understanding- unless his words and conduct were such that
he had rem;on to know that the other party would
he and was in fact misled."

l t cannot be a declaration of a trust, it does not
name a trm;tee or even provide for one; it does not
<lescrihe the trust res; there was no transfer or delivery
of prop\•rty, and it leaves all of the terms to be agreed
upon. l n addition, the judgment specifically states that
tlH~ trust is to be rreated. Tf it were considered a contract

.,.,
to create a tr11st, a jndg111<>nt of :-;peeiiie pcrforniani·e
would be fatall.'' <ldechve. 1 S('{)t/ 011 Tnrsts, Sec. :iO.l
at page 228:
''Hpecifie enforcement. Although a tru:-;t is
specifically enforceable at the suit of the benefieiary, even though the trust was gratuitously
created, there is a question whether a contract
to create a trust is specifically enforceable, even
though it is binding as a contract and an action
at law for damages would lie for failure to perform it. Although the promise to create a trust
i~ under seal and is binding as a contract in jurisdictions in whieh promises under seal are still
binding, yet it would seem that it is not specifically enforceable if no consideration was given.
The rule that a gratuitous promise under seal
is not specifically enforceable is well settled. In
such a case the maxim that equity will not aid
a volunteer is applicable. It would seem that the
rule is applicable where the promise is a promise
to create a trust."
Furthermore, it says it is a stipulation and not a
declaration or contract to create a trrn;t.

It cannot be a stipulation. rrhe only resemblance
to that type of document is that it said it was a stipulation. Counsel for the DaughtPrs at the hearing on
August 29, 1959 statPd there was complete disagreement.
so the memorandum couldn't be a stipulation (Tr. Aug.
29, 1, 2).

\'lhat the memorandum is can only be determined
bv the construction the court gave it at the time it
e~tered the judgment of Oetoher 2, 1959. It is apparent
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frolll tl1e n·<·nrd tliat the (•ourt ba~;ed its ·F'indings of

1<'8d and ( ~onrlm;ions of Law entirely on the memor-

andt1111. 'l'li1s l<>a<ls to the eonclnsion that the court cons1d1'l'Pd tilt~ rn<•111ornrnhrn1 as a stipulation of the parties
<·nnsentinµ: to the e>ntry· of tlw judgment. This was error
IH•<·anse the <·ourt was required to interpret and construe
the lang-uag-e of tliP memorandum and to supply material
terms to make it a (•om1wtent stipulation.
The general rule is well expressed m 30A Am Ju,r
( .f urlqme11ts), Sec. 145 at pa.qc 254:

·'lt is not essential that a stipulation or
<'ornsent for the entry of judgment be in any parlieular form, except as statutes or rules of court
may otherwise require. It should clearly imdicate
llu,, fact of aqrecnient and the judgment agreed
upon, and the judgment should follow the stipulation or agreement. As a general rule, a judgment to the rendition of which the parties have
agreed should show on its face that it was entered
hy consent, but such a showing is not indispensable, and the fact may be established by other
evidence." (Italics added.)

Counsel for the Daughters stated to the court at
the August 29 hearing that agreement by the parties
was impossihlt~ ('l'r Ang 29 1 ). He offered the memorarnlum a~ plaintiff's ~xhihit 1. Counsel for the Mother
objected to its admission nnless it was premised on the
proposition that any transfer of property was merely
a deposit with the administrator preliminary to final
ag-reement under the memorandum. The Mother's position was set forth by tlw following statement by counsel:

""" * • it is the position of Mrs. Voorhees
that in order to protect her under the stipulation
that she should not be required to make these
transfers until the trust is created." (Tr Aug
29 95).

In addition to its formal requirements, the courts
have characterized a stipulation as a contract; and when
its· validity is brought into question, it is subject to all
of the tests of a contract.
The contraetnal nature of a stipulation i:--; stated in
3 Freeman on Judgnients, Sec. 1350 at page 2773:
"A consent judgment is undoubtedly contractual in its nature and should be construed
as though it were a contract. It is based wholly
upon the agreement of the parties with respect
to the matter in controversy in the action and
involves no judicial inquiry into, or preliminary
adjudication of, the facts or the law applicable
thereto. The agreement or consent renders this
unnecessary and improper. But nevertheless, and
notwithstanding statements frequently made to
the contrary, the judgment is obviously something
more than a contract, being rather the result of
a contract and its embodiment in a form which
places it and the matters covered by it beyond
further controversy."
The California Court stated in Palmer vs. Ci'iy of
Long Beach, 199 P. '2d 952 at page 957:
"A stipulation is an agreement between counsel respecting business before the court (Bouv.
Law Diet., Rawle's Third Edition), and like any
other agreement or contract, it is essential that
the parties or their counsel agree to its terms."
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'l 1 l1e

prov111<'t'

of a stipulation is the elimination of

proof rc·lating to factual matters. \Vhen a stipulation
pnrports to <lrterrnine the law, it invades the functions
of fop ronrt arnl thus has no binding effect hefore or
after judgment. 50 ~1m .!11r (Stipulations) Sec 5, at
poo <' G07 :

"lt has frequently been stated as a general
rule that the decision of questions of law must
rest upon the court, uninfluenced by stipulations
of the parties, and it is generally held, accordingly, that stipulations as to what the law is are
invalid and ineffective."

A stipulation is a recital of facts upon which the
parties agreed and the rourt can enter a judgment without determining issues of law. If Findings of Fact are
ma<le, the~· must he within the stipulated facts or those
reasonably inferred from what is stated in the stipulation. 3 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 1348 at page 2771:

"It is not essential that a stipulation or consent be in any particular form or that it be made
in open court, except as the statutes or rules of
court may otherwise require. It should clearly
indicate the fact of agreement and the judgment
agreed upon, and the judgment should follow the
stipulation or agreement.
Rince the court's authority is limited by the
consent or stipulation, if the agreement is not
full enough to dispose of all the claims or rights
in the subject matter, the court has no power
to supplement or construe the agreement by the
insertion of extraneous matter in the decree. Any
failure of the stipulation to fully express the
intention of the parties must be corrected by

2G
appropriate action." Also see Rees vs. Archibald,
6 Utah 2d 264, 311 Pac. 2d 788.
The memorandum of understanding cannot support
a judgment. It did not create any contractual rights or
contain an agreenwnt of facts upon which a court could
declare any rights.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPOR~ED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND THEY AFFIRMATIVELY SHOW
·THAT APPELLANT WAS WRONGFULLY DENIED THE
RIGHT TO DEFEND HER PROPERTY.

vVhen the court gave the memorandum of understanding the quality of evidence and entered the judgment of Octoher ~' 1959, the l\Iother lost her right to
def end her title. She consistently asserted her o\vnership of the separate property and her ability to sustain
this position is conclusively supported by the record.
No other person came forward and submitted to
examination nor was any documentary evidence introduced questioning the title to the separate property.
The warranty deeds naming the Mother grantee had
heen introduced in the probate court at the time of the
hearing on the petition to revoke letters of administra·
tion (Rl 2655 29). The decrees of distribution did not
refer to the October 2 judgment but were based entirely
upon the memorandum of understanding. Finding of
Fact number 7 provides as follows :
"Heretofore on the 1st day of April, 1959,
all of the heirs of said decedent entered into a
written agreement which provides that all of the

_,

•}'"'

pr11('eeds from tlw estate should be placed in

t, us!. 'all net income therefrom to be paid to

rs. Y oorhees not less than quarterly during
IH·r !ifP an<l the balance upon her death to Betty
llannnd
and Beverlv
(R 2655 431).
.
. Clvde.'"
.
~l

'l'l1e

("Pllrt

in making its Findings of Fact did not

1·(•11sider the judgnwnt of Odoher 2, 1959 a valid source
of titk. This is the eonrt's third distinct determination
of titl0 to the separate property and illustrates the

transformation of tlie memorandum of understanding
from a stipulation so incomplete that counsel refused
t(I fik it witl1 t11e court to an agreement possessing more

int0grity tlian the judgment in the civil action.
Sedion 75-12-5, Ftah Code Annotated 1953 provides
that t!H•re must be a showing to the satisfaction of the
eonrt that it is for the best interests of the beneficiaries
of the estate, that there be a partial distribution of the
f~stak TJw l'o1ut made a finding that it was for the
best interest::; of the heirs to distribute a part of the
E:-tate to the Daughters and that it would not interfere
with tl1e administration of the Estate or the distribution
llf' as.-;ets. Pnless tht> memorandum of understanding is
t:o11siderPd to he a stipulation consenting to the partial
distribution, there is nothing in the record to support
this finding. Tn arldition to this, the title to the property
was in litigation and the distrihution pursuant to the
111e11wrandum of understanding was impossible until a
t rnste0 was appointed. The language of Finding number
9 is ns follow:-; (R3 2655 432):
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"The Court further finds that it is for the
best interests of the heirs of said estate and will
in no way interfere with the due administration
of the estate or the distribution of the assets
thereof to distribute to the said Beverly Clyde
and Betty Hayward a two-third undivided interest in the real property remaining in said estate
and located in Sevier County, State of Utah, and
sale of which has not heretofore been confirmed
by this Court, and charging the distributive share
of sai<l heirs with the appraised value of said
property at the rate of $15.50 per acre on the
basis of each whole acre received by said heirs
in connection therewith."
This finding is not supported by the record and
justification is not simplified when the proceedings of
February 1, 1960 are considered. In that hearing, the
petition of the administrator to confirm the sale of thP
real property to the intervener according to its contract
with the Mother and the petition of the Daughters to
distribute all of the real property to them, subject to a
charge in favor of the trust to be created were before
the court (R2 2655 290-300). The intervener had agreed
with the administrator to pay $15.50 ( 50¢ above the
contract price) per acre. Mr. Hanson for the intervener
testified:
''Q. Now you are willing to go through with the
offer that you have made to the administrator,
Walker Bank & Trust Company, for purchase
of this property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which is to include the fifteen fifty per acre
plus interest at four percent since October
of 1958, the date that * * *
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A.

YPS, sir." (Tr Feb 1 40).

l•'ollcnYing this offer, the hi<l of Mr. Winch was pre:-:t•nted to tlw <"ourt h~, ronnsel for the Daughters in the
a.11101111t of $17.:>0 ]>Pl' acre. The intervener then raised
lii;.; hid to $1 ~.00 p<>r aere. Notwithstan<ling the bids, the
··ou1 t d(•<·idPd against the sale of the property and ordered
thP distribution of a ~/:) intc•rest in the property to the
Da11ght<>rs.
How <'ould it be for the best interests of all the
l1eirs wlwn an offer to purchase was made at $18.00 an
acre for property a ppraise<l at $15.00 an acre T This
might he hPnefieial to the Daughters because they have
a 1·pady-made private salt- at which a profit of $2.50 an
acre eonld he realized. lt is no benefit to the Mother
lieeause 1vhen the court refused to confirm the sale, she
was requin•d to perform according to her contract with
thL' int<-~rTener. 'fhis compelled her to contribute 50¢
per acre from her own funds to the trust to be created
instead of getting $3.00 an acre for the property. This
not onlv illustrates tht- complete lack of evidence to
support the findings but it accentuates the proposition
that the J\lother has bf'en denied a right to be heard.

1Tpon the premise of these findings, the decrees of
distribution cannot be sustained. If they are considered
valid, it mu~t he on the ground that the Mother's attorney
deliberately Rtipulated away her rights. The record does
not hare thi~ out but, if it were so, she should not be
deprived of her rights. Palmer vs. City of Long Beach,
s11prn, at 958:
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''ln view of an attorney's duty to his client
it should not lightly Le m;sumed that he stipulated
away hit-5 case. "'
~, :Stipulations must be given
a reasonable con::struction with a view to giving
effect to the intent of the partie::s and the language
used will not be so construed as to give it the
flffect of an admi8sion of a fact obviously intended
to bl~ controverted, or the waiver of a right not
plainly intended to he relinquished."
'Ii'

rr1w significance of the manner in which the proceedings "-err ('onclucted was that the 1\1 otlwr was led
to believe that her rights were being protected until the
terms of the trust agreement were settled. Under the
state of the record, it can onl~- be assumed that the
Mother was wrongfully denied her rights. In such cases
equity is quick to grant relief. In Re Rice's Estate, supra:
'•Equity will relieve one seeking relief from
the effect of a judgment or decree procured hy
conduct of the successful party which prevents the
injured party from appearing at the hearing or
trial on the merits. Under the present state of
the record, this court must assume the executrix
knowingly and willfully made misrepresentations
to the petitioner which prevented him from appearing at the hearing and obtaining the property
that he claims should have been his. Predicated
on these alleged fraudulent acts, petitioner was
denied his day in court."
The finding of the eonrt that the partial distribution
was for the best interest of all the heirs raises further
implications. The .i\Iother not only stands to suffer serious financial detriment, but the memorandum of understanding passes the title b~- wa~- of the decrees of dis-
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i rihut ion to tl1<> Daught<•rs without thP aid of any con-

sidt•rntion. [Tmler sueh cireumstanees and in light of the
natural li<ln<'iar~· relationship existing, all of the events
must he look0d nt with <'lose serutiny. [f it is found
tltat the fl! otl1er has been deprived of her property
\\'itlwut the right to lw heard and under conditions of
1111 l'ai rnPss, t hP decre<>s of distribution must he vacated.
This eourt lias held that where a fiduciary relationship
Pxists hehn~0n the parties, the conduct of the party who
prnfits 11m8t he viewed with care and any advantage
gained must Jip fair and upon full and complete disclol'nre. Arntt vs. To1nlinson, 9 Utah '2d 71, 337 Pac. '2d
720: Child vs. C'lz ild, 8 [! tah 2d 261, 332 Pac. 2, 981. In
C!hild vs. Cl1£ld, the effeet of an instrument under such
cin·m118tanees was subjected to the following test:
"When an attack is made upon the lower
court's findings on the ground requiring an appraisal of the weight of the evidence, this court
is also confronted with difficulty as to what went
on in the mind of the trial judge as to his belief
of witm-'ssPs and finding facts. It is because of the
sanctity with whieh the law regards written documenb; that the rule has become well established
in this jurisdiction that to find the deed had a
purpose other than appeared on its face requires
elear and convincing evidence."
rrlw problem in this case is not only what the court
considPrt>d in entering the decrees of distribution, but
what was available in the record and what should have
hcen mad(~ a subject of inquiry before property rights
wen· determined. The controversy presented had its
hPginning prior to the death of Hillard L. Voorhees.

The Daughten; knew of tlw <leeds to their ~lother an<l
wer(' aware of the deeds in th('il' favor ('rr Oct 21 58-59).
They also knew that their fatlwr did not intend to leave
the descent of his propPrt!' to such a d('vice as a \\~II
(11 r Oct 21 39).
After the death of their father, the Daughters sought
advice as to tlH' best method to preserve the Estate
their Motlwr had acquired by rea::;on of the death of
her husband. rrhe daughter, Bett!", in a deposition stated:

"Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

Do you know whose idea this trust was initially'?
l believe that-now this is" I believe", I won't
be quoted-I believe that Ed Clyde suggested
to Beverly that it was a nice way of handling
things for a widow because she had no worries. I think Beverly told my mother that.
Do you know when that conversation would
have been?
That would have been in June.

OH
A. 1956." (Deposition of Betty Hayward in civil
action 4784 Feb. 5, 1959 34.)

This suggestion was followed by the Mother and a
trust agreement was drafted so some of the burden of
management could be assumed by others and relieve the
Daughters of their concern. The trust agreement was
not acceptable to the Daughters because it was not irrevocable and the daughter, Betty Hayward, informed the
Mother of their ~mspicions:

''Q.

Did you think that these items should be
included in the estate 7

.\.
(~.

A.
(~.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

If hPr trust had been set up properly and
like slH• promised to, then it was perfectly
all right to let it go as it was.
In other words, if you got this property in
an inevocahle trust, you didn't care what
~·our mother did with it?
rrhat is right.
She didn't have to include it in the estate?
'rhat is right.
But if she reneged on the trust, you wanted
to get it in the estate-Yes.
-so you could get at least part of it?
Yes.
But you would have taken all of it through
the trusU
Yes, sir." (Deposition of Betty Hayward civil
action 4784 31).

At the 11earing on Octolwr 21, 1957, the Mother had
appeared before the C'ourt and testified about the circumstances of the dee<h; eonveying to her the separate
property (Exh -!, 5, 6, and 7: Tr Oct 21 96-98).

''Q.

(By l\lr. Worsley) Where did you get these
doemuents 4 through 7 and 13 T
A. Mr. Y oorhees gave them to me.
Q. And about what time was that, Mrs. Voorhees T
A. Soon after they were made.
Q. 'I1hat would be soon after the year 1940!
A. Yes.
Q. And can you tell us, would that be within
a year do you think!
A. No. It would be within a day.

Q. \Vithin a day or so?
A. * * * Objection by Mr. Nielsen.
Q. Mrs. Voorhees, after these documents Bx.
hibits 4 through 7 and 13, as you say' were

delivered to you by Mr. Voorhees,· where
did they remain between that time and the
time of his death f Do you know where they
were?
A. In my possession.
Q. And were they in a box?
A. r:rhey were.
Q. vVas that a metal locked box?
A. No. It didn't have a lock. It was in a metal
box.

Q.

And where was that box kept during this
period¥
A. Well, I kept it in various places.
Q. And was it at any time in the same large
safe in which Mr. Voorhees had other papers'
A. You mean prior to his death?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. You kept it apart but within the home in
Manti?
A. That is right."
The testimony of tlte Mother in the hearings on
August 29 and February 15, 1959 about the deeds wa~
the same. She asserted her title to the property on
every possible occasion. At the hearing on February 1.
1960 she appean~d without counsel and asked the eonrt
to protect her rights to the property. Her words were
"I turned it to the administrator to be sold and tn
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'''·twdit1• tfw fonning- of this trust and that is why I

prob·st

11."

(

'l'r F<•h I IS).

Kc•g-11rning "·itlt the ord(>r of October 28, 1957 reliev-

ing- t lie

~fotltPr

of the duties of administration, red flags

1ffrP \\';1vPd 011

eight oe<'asions that should have caused

a probatP

to stop until the rights were determined.

<'011rt

The lirst su<'h warning was thf' refusal to file the mem-

orarnlnm of nn<1Nstanding in the hearing on April 1,
I~J;:~l and tlit> incompletf'ness of the memorandum when
submitted to the eourt as Exhibit 1 on August 29, 1959.
Tl1Pn follows: the testimony of the Mother in the August

irnd September 1959 hParings; the failure of the Daughters to f'.nme forward and testify in support of their
<'laims; the admission in evidence of the deeds conveying
tlw separate 1n·operty to the Mother (Exh 4, 5, 6, and 7);
emrnsf~l

for the Daughters' statement that agreement

was impossible on August 29, 1959; the suit filed by the
intPrvener claiming adversely as against the Estate; the
Daughters' petition to have all the property distributed
to thern; and finally the Mother's appearance without
r·ounsl'l to protest the distribution in February, 1960.
The derrees of distribution cannot stand in view
of the disn'gard of the :Mother's rights. The title to
the property has not been divested from her under a
judicial proress where she has had the right to be heard
and to have her rights determined according to the law
as announced by this court.
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CONCLUSION
When a person submits himself to a court that the
law may determine his rights, it is fundamental that lw
be afforded his day in court. It is equally fundamental
that his day in court includes the opportunity to present
his claim or assert his defenses. Anything less than
this makes the law a poor protector. The judgment and
decrees should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

FRED H. EVANS
Attorney for Def enda•nl
and Appelkimt.

